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MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE: 
A REFUTATION REVISITED 
William Hasker 
This paper carries forward the discussion initiated by the publication in 1986 
of "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge." Answers are given to two objec-
tions that have been raised against the original argument. Next, an alternative 
argument by Robert Adams is discussed; this argument has the advantage of 
avoiding reliance on one of the most controversial premises of the original 
argument. Finally, a definition is given for "S brings it about that Y," and this 
definition is used to construct a proof of the "power entailment principle." 
I 
In the years since the publication of "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge," 1 
the argument of that essay has played a significant part in the continuing 
debate over divine middle knowledge. Several defenders of middle knowl-
edge have commented on it critically, and an opponent of middle knowledge 
has used the argument as the model for a parallel argument of his own for 
the same conclusion.2 In view of this attention, this seems an opportune time 
to revisit the "refutation" in order to assess its continuing relevance to the 
middle knowledge controversy. 
The argument begins by posing the question, who or what brings about the 
truth of the counterfactuals of freedom postulated by middle knowledge? In 
the first stage it is argued that it cannot be true, as has sometimes been 
claimed, that the agent named in the counterfactual brings about its truth. In 
the second stage it is argued that if this is so, then the agent cannot be free 
in performing the action described in the counterfactual. So there are no true 
counterfactuals of freedom. 
The argument as originally presented is both lengthy and complex, but for 
present purposes we can make use of a condensed (but quite accurate) version 
devised by Thomas Flint. He begins by stating three premises of the argu-
ment: 
(1) If E brings it about that "Q" is true, then E is a token of en event-type 
T such that [(some token of T occurs) ~ Q] and [-(some token of T 
occurs) ~ _QJ.3 and E is the first token of T which occurs. (Throughout 
this essay, the single arrow will be used for the counterfactual condi-
tional, the double arrow for entailment.) 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 12 No.2 April 1995 
All ri ghts reserved 
223 
224 Faith and Philosophy 
(2) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world 
than are particular facts. (Hence, worlds which differ from the actual 
world with regard to factual content are closer than those which differ 
from it with regard to counterfactuals of freedom.) 
(3) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and "Q" 
is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q. (This is PEP, 
the "power entailment principle.") 
Flint then summarizes the argument as follows: 
Suppose that there is a true counterfactual of freedom about me (symbolized 
by A ~ B) with a true antecedent. Suppose, furthermore, that we say that I 
can bring about the truth of this counterfactual, and that I do so by performing 
the action specified by B. If (I) is true, then I can bring about the truth of 
this counterfactual only if it's true that, had I not performed the action speci-
fied in the consequent B, the counterfactual would not have been true. But, 
argues Hasker, if (2) is true, then this necessary condition will never be 
satisfied, for there will always be a world in which some of the circumstances 
specified in the antecedent A are false which is closer to the actual world 
than is any world in which the counterfactual of freedom A ~ B is false. 
Therefore, there is no counterfactual of freedom the truth of which I can bring 
about. But if (3) is true, then for me to have the power to bring it about that -B 
even though A is true, I must have the power to bring it about that A ~ - B, 
for the Molinist is committed to saying that (A & -B) entails (A ~ -B). Since, 
as we say, it follows from (I) and (2) that I don't have the power to bring 
about the truth of a counterfactual of freedom, it follows from (1), (2), and 
(3), along with our initial assumption that there is a true counterfactual of 
freedom, that I don't have the power to bring it about that -B given A. But 
of course, as a libertarian, the Molinist is committed to saying that I do have 
the power to bring it about that -B given A. If our three crucial premises 
(1) through (3) are beyond reproach, it follows that we have no choice but 
to surrender our initial assumption. In other words, it follows that there are 
no true counterfactuals of freedom.4 
Flint goes on to say, "it seems to me that Hasker's argument is surely valid; 
if (1) through (3) were all undeniable from the Molinist perspective, then the 
Molinists would have no choice but to abandon that perspective" (p. 105). 
Since he is more than reluctant to abandon Molinism, Flint proceeds to argue 
against premise (2), which states that for the purpose of evaluating counter-
factuals worlds which differ from the actual world with regard to factual 
content are closer than those which differ from it with regard to counterfac-
tuals of freedom.s As Flint correctly notes, I provide support for (2) by 
arguing for 
(a) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world 
than are counterfactuals backed by laws of nature 6 
and 
(b) Counterfactuals backed by law s of nature are more fundamental features 
of the world than are particular facts. 
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Of these two premises, (a) is by far the more controversial. Several argu-
ments have been offered for (a).7 But for present purposes I will limit myself 
to a single argument, the argument which points out that, since the funda-
mental laws of nature are indeterministic, counterfactuals based on them are 
only would-probably conditionals-they assert the probability, or objective 
propensity, for the event affirmed in the consequent to occur, given the cir-
cumstances as stated in the antecedent. The point is not, as Flint supposes, 
that I assume there is some sort of non-logical "necessary connection" be-
tween the antecedent and the consequent of a counterfactual of freedom. (I 
fear 1 have misled Flint on this point by my use of Pollock's term, "necessi-
tation conditionals," to refer to the counterfactuals of freedom.) Rather, the 
point concerns the respective logical strength of various kinds of condition-
als, as measured by the guarantees they provide (if true) about what happens 
in various possible worlds. Consider, then, a series of conditionals, all of the 
general form, "If P, then Q." If a conditional is logically necessary, it guar-
antees that in no possible world will we find "P" true and "Q" false. If it is 
a deterministic causal conditional, then we will not find that combination in 
any world that shares its laws of nature with the actual world. If it is a 
counterfactual of freedom, we cannot have "P" true and "Q" false in the actual 
world or any of the set of possible worlds that are "closest to" (Pollock: 
"minimally changed from") the actual world. But with a would-probably 
conditional, we can have "P" true and "Q" false in the actual world, and also 
in possible worlds as close as you please to the actual world. And this shows, 
I maintain, that would-probably conditionals should be weighted less heavily 
than counterfactuals of freedom in determining the similarities of possible 
worlds. 
In practice, of course, the probabilities involved in many counterfactuals 
based on laws of nature are so high that they are treated, for practical pur-
poses, as if they were deterministic causal conditionals. (Quantum indeter-
minacy does not in general make a perceptible difference to the behavior of 
macroscopic objects.) But while this is important for our practical use of 
these conditionals, I do not see that it makes any difference at all to their 
logical status as would-probably conditionals. So I believe it is entirely 
reasonable to hold that counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental 
features of the world than are counterfactuals backed by laws of nature.8 
Yet another possible difficulty with the first stage of the argument is pointed 
out by Robert M. Adams when he writes that a "debatable point is Hasker's 
assumption that if Molinism implies, as he argued, that we do not bring about 
the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us, it also implies that we do 
not have the power to bring about their truth. The assumption is plausible, 
but 1 am not sure it has been proved. In particular, I do not take it to have 
been proved by my recasting of the first stage of Hasker's argument.,,9 
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Without doubt, Adams has identified a lacuna in the argument as originally 
stated. The argument proceeds to the conclusion that we do not bring about 
the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us, and then without further ado 
assumes that we lack the power to do this. IO But surely, some explanation of 
this transition is needed. And this point is crucial for the success of the 
argument as a whole: we need to obtain the result that we lack the power to 
bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom in order to proceed to the 
second stage of the argument and reach the final conclusion. 
I believe, however, that the gap can be closed. The only non-trivial as-
sumption in this first stage of the argument, in addition to (1) and (2), is that 
if we bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us we do so 
by performing the action specified in the consequent under the conditions 
specified in the antecedent. Now I submit that all three of these assumptions 
are such that it is reasonable to take the view that, if true at all, they are 
necessarily true. But what is validly deduced from necessarily true premises 
is itself necessary. So if the argument is valid (as Flint agrees), and the 
premises are necessarily true, then what follows is not simply that we do not 
bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us, but that neces-
sarily we do not do this. But what we necessarily fail to do is not in our 
power to do. 
But are the premises of the argument true? I believe that they are, and I 
have argued in support of the premise (namely, (2)), which has proved to be 
most controversial. Nevertheless, I am willing to admit that the complexity 
of the argument even in Flint's streamlined version leaves a number of points 
at which doubts can arise and toward which critics can direct their fire. It 
would seem desirable, then, to reach the objective by a simpler, more straight-
forward route, if this is possible. In order to investigate this possibility, we 
tum to Robert Adams' alternative argument. 
II 
Adams' argument (with steps renumbered) proceeds as follows: 
(6) According to Molinism,11 the truth of all true counterfactuals of freedom 
about us is explanatorily prior to God's decision to create us. 
(7) God's decision to create us is explanatorily prior to our existence. 
(8) Our existence is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions. 
(9) The relation of explanatory priority is transitive. 
(10) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 6-9) that the truth of all true 
counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to all of our 
choices and actions. 
(11) The relation of explanatory priority is asymmetrical. 
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(12) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 10-11) that none of our choices 
and actions is explanatorily prior to the truth of any true counterfactual 
of freedom about us. 
(13) Whatever we bring about is something to which some choice or action 
of ours is explanatorily prior. 
(14) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 11-12) that we do not bring 
about the truth of any counterfactual of freedom about us (pp. 346-47). 
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Commenting on this argument, Adams says, "The central idea in this argu-
ment is that of explanatory priority, or an order of explanation .... Like the 
Scholastics, I do mean to distinguish this sort of priority from temporal 
priority. Even if there was no time before God decided to create us, or if 
God is timeless, God's knowing various things is explanatorily prior to God's 
deciding to create us." (One might add that this notion is particularly impor-
tant for Molinism: middle knowledge is "middle" precisely because, in the 
order of explanation, it falls in between God's "natural knowledge" of the 
necessar:r truths, and his "free knowledge" which depends on his own free 
actions.) 2 
As we have already noted, Adams does not believe his argument establishes 
that we lack the power to bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom 
about us. He explains his reasoning in an endnote: "The issue here would 
be whether the thesis ascribed in [(6)] to Molinism, if true, could nonetheless 
be falsified by us if we did something we will not in fact do-whether there 
are acts we could perform but won't that would reverse the order of expla-
nation discussed in the first stage of the argument, by depriving the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom of its independence of the truth of their antece-
dents" (p. 353). Adams' reasoning can be expanded as follows: The argu-
ment 6-14 is valid, and the intermediate premises (7, 8, 11, 13) are necessary 
truths. So (6) entails (14), and the negation of (14) entails the negation of 
(6). So for us to have the power to bring about that (14) is false would be 
for us to have the power to bring it about that (6) is false 13 -that is to say, 
if we have the power to bring about the truth of a counterfactual of freedom 
about us, we also have the power to bring it about that (in this instance) the 
truth of a counterfactual of freedom about us is not explanatorily prior to 
God's decision to create us. Adams goes on to say, "An affirmative answer 
to this question [viz., whether we have the power to falsify (6)] seems to me 
bizarre, and unlikely to be appealing to Molinists. but I'd rather not undertake 
here the burden of justifying its exclusion." 
I believe, however, that the exclusion in question is not at all difficult to 
justify. One way to do this would be by the route pursued in the previous 
section: If the premises of the argument are true, they are necessarily true,14 
and so the conclusion (in this case (4» is necessarily true as well. But there 
is another, possibly more compelling, way to show that we lack the power in 
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question. To see this, we add the following two premises to the beginning 
of Adams' argument: 
(4) According to Molinism, God is perfectly provident. 
(5) According to Molinism, if God is perfectly provident, the truth of all 
true counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to God's 
decision to create us. 
The expression "perfectly provident" is taken from Alfred J. Freddoso's 
authoritative exposition of Molinism; it designates the traditional strong doc-
trine of divine providence which Molinism upholds. Freddoso describes the 
doctrine as follows: 
As traditionally expounded, the doctrine of divine providence involves the 
thesis that God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, and 
provides for all the effects that constitute His artifact the created universe 
with its entire history, and executes His chosen plan by playing an active 
causal role sufficient to ensure its exact realization .... God's speculative 
postvolitional knowledge of the created world-His so-called knowledge of 
vision-is to be explained wholly by reference to (i) His prevolitional knowl-
edge and (ii) His knowledge of what He Himself has willed to do. Unlike 
us, God does not have to be acted upon by outside causes in order for His 
cognitive potentialities to be fully actualized; He does not, as it were, have 
to look outside Himself in order to find out what His creative act has 
wrought." 15 
The point is this: God, in his decisions about which persons to create, con-
sults his middle knowledge to determine how they would respond to various 
circumstances in which he might place them. So the truth-values of the 
counterfactuals of freedom concerning created free agents must be fixed prior 
to his decision to create the agents, which is what (5) says. From this Molinist 
perspective the truth of (4) and (5) cannot be gainsaid. 
But now we are able to assert, following reasoning which parallels the 
reasoning of Adams explained above, that 
(15) If it is in our power to bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom 
about us, it is in our power to bring it about that God is not perfectly 
provident (from 4-14 and PEP). 
But surely it is the case that 
(16) According to Molinism, it is not in our power to bring it about that God 
is not perfectly provident. 
And so we may conclude that 
(17) According to Molinism, it is not in our power to bring about the truth 
of counterfactuals of freedom about us (from 15-16). 
Now, I cannot exci:Jde absolutely the possibility that there might be some 
professed Molinist who would deny the truth of (16), and so avoid the con-
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clusion of this argument. But I think it is clear that it is deeply repugnant to 
Molinism to attribute to us the power-even the unexercised power-to bring 
it about that God is not perfectly provident. Indeed, "repugnant" may be too 
weak an expression in this context. Immediately following the passage from 
Freddoso quoted above, he goes on to say, "Indeed, as a being who is 'pure 
actuality,' He cannot depend causally on any other being for His perfections" 
(p. 5). This is as much as to say that it is incompatible with an essential 
property of God-that God is "pure actuality"-for God's perfect knowledge 
to be dependent on a creature, as it would be if (6) were false. But in that 
case, the power to bring it about that (6) is false is the power to bring it about 
that God lacks one of his essential properties. And not even the most fervent 
desire to save Molinism can justify attributing that sort of power to us. I6 
I maintain, therefore, that (17) has been demonstrated, and if so the second 
stage of the refutation of middle knowledge can proceed just as it does in 
Flint's summary. And the consequence of this is stark: there are no true 
counterfactuals of freedom.I7 
III 
It would, however, be entirely premature to expect a capitulation from the 
Molinists at this point. For as presently formulated, both stages of the argu-
ment depend essentially on (3), the power entailment principle. So a critic 
who does not find (3) to be an evident truth can seize upon this as a weak 
point at which to attack the argument. Such an attack has been mounted by 
Thomas Flint. He does not, indeed, say outright that (3) is false, nor has he 
presented a counterexample to the principle. But he finds the expression 
"bring about" to be seriously ambiguous and unclear, and until this expression 
is clarified he thinks it is impossible to say whether or not (3) is true-or for 
that matter, whether or not (3) is inconsistent with Molinism. 
In order to put this discussion in context, it will be helpful to set out briefly 
what has previously been stated concerning the sense of "bring about.,,18 In 
my view, 
(i) A brings about Bl9 
is intermediate in strength between 
(ii) A causes B 
and 
(iii) A occurs, and if A were to occur, B would occur. 
I take it to be evident that (i) is stronger than (iii)-the latter, which I term 
the "counterfactual dependence relation" is remarkably weak; many philoso-
phers seem to see in it much more than is actually there. (i) is, on the other 
hand, weaker than (ii); every instance of causing is an instance of bringing 
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about, but the converse does not hold. One example of bringing about which 
is not causal comes from Jaegwon Kim?O When Socrates' jailor caused him 
to drink the hemlock, he both caused and brought about Socrates' death; he 
also, by the same action, brought about Xantippe's becoming a widow. But 
the link between the jailor's action and Xantippe's widowhood is not "causal" 
in the relevant sense-no conceivable form of causal isolation for Xantippe 
could have prevented her from becoming a widow. Another example con-
cerns the truth of propositions: By reading a newspaper I bring it about that 
"Hasker will read a newspaper tomorrow" was true yesterday, but I don't 
think I cause that proposition to have been true yesterday. Beyond this, it 
can be said that "bringing about" is a relation which is transitive, asymmet-
rical, and irret1exive, such that what is brought about obtains in consequence 
of that which brings it about. (These formal features are shared by both 
bringing about and causation; counterfactual dependence, on the other hand, 
is nontransitive, nonsymmetrical, and ret1exive.) 
Now I have to say that it seems to me that these explanations are suffi-
ciently clear that I am able to grasp propositions (such as (3» involving the 
notion of "bringing about," and in some cases (again, such as (3» to see that 
those propositions are true. Flint, however, demurs, and complains that I 
have failed to recognize that "the territory between causal and counterfactual 
power is a vast and largely uncharted land, one which harbors a plethora of 
distinct accounts of bringing about" (p. 113). To illustrate his point, Flint 
proposes two possible definitions of "bring about"; each definition possesses 
some initial plausibility, but on neither definition is it at all plausible that 
both (1) and (3) are true. And this creates a reasonable suspicion, Flint thinks, 
that it is only by preserving the ambiguity of "bring about" that I can make it 
seem plausible that all the premises of my argument against Molinism are true. 
In a recent manuscript Flint has t1eshed out his objection still further by 
elaborating no less than eleven distinct definitions for "S brings it about that 
y.,,21 But in this whole array of definitions there is not a single one that will 
permit all of the premises in the argument against middle knowledge to be 
true together. Thus the burden falls on the opponent of middle know ledge to 
show that his argument is not based on mere equivocation. 
Clearly, Flint has presented a challenge that must be taken seriously. I 
would agree, furthermore, that none of the definitions he suggests is accept-
able as it stands. Still, some of them do deserve serious consideration. Take 
for example 
(BA3) S brings it about that Y iff: 0-Y, and for some X, S causes it to be 
the case that X, and X ~ Y. 
This formula has significant merits. The first conjunct insures that what is 
brought about is a contingent proposition. If we assume that an agent causes 
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her own action, then bringing about anything always involves causing some-
thing, even if that which is brought about is not itself caused. And many 
cases of bringing about which are not causal are cases in which what is 
brought about is entailed by what is caused; thus, my bringing about the past 
truth of a proposition by my present action. So far, then, so good. 
But the definition fails for my other example: Socrates' death does not 
entail Xantippe's widowhood all by itself; for that, we need also the historical 
information that Socrates and Xantippe were married at the time. This sug-
gests a move to another definition suggested by Flint: 
(BA4) S brings it about that Y iff: O-Y, and for some X, S causes it to be 
the case that X, and (X & H) =} Y (where "H" stands for the history 
of the world prior to the occurrence of X). 
This takes care of Xantippe nicely, but now there is another problem: both 
(BA3) and (BA4) are far too generous in what they permit an agent to bring 
about. According to (BA3), if I bring it about that I see a sunrise I also bring 
about the sunrise, and according to (BA4), an agent by performing any action 
whatever brings about the entire past history of the universe, which is im-
plausible. To remedy this, we can add to (BA4) the restrictions that (a) "H" 
by itself does not entail "Y," and (b) it is not the case that if "X" were false 
"y' would still be true.22 (This permits us to drop the first conjunct, since 
any necessary truth will be true even if "X" is false.) And so we have 
(BA4*) S brings it about that Y iff: For some X, S causes it to be the case 
that X, and (X & H) =} Y, and -(H =} Y), and -(-X --t Y). 
Upon reflection, (BA4 *) seems to me to be a good candidate for a definition 
of the intuitive notion of "bringing about" with which I have been working. 
There is plenty of room for further refinement, of course, and it is hard to be 
sure there could not be some counterexample which would force the addition 
of more clauses to the definition. But I am willing for the time being to accept 
it as a basis for discussion. One merit of (BA4 *) is that it guarantees the 
satisfaction of the condition stated in (1) for any instance of bringing about 
as defined by the formula?3 To be sure, this is not essential for the success 
of our revised argument, since (1) does not playa role in this argument. But 
(1) does seem to represent a plausible condition on bringing about, and so it 
is satisfying to have its truth preserved by our definition. 
More importantly, however, (BA4*) allows for a straightforward proof of (3), 
the power entailment principle. Suppose that the propositions "X," "P," and 
"H" are such that if S were to cause it to be the case that X she would thereby 
bring it about that P. Suppose, that is, that (H & X) ~ P, and -(H ~ P), and 
-(-X ~ P). Now according to (BA4*), if S, by causing it to be true that X, 
were to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," then by that very same 
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action S would bring it about that Q, provided that -(H ~ Q), and -(-X -t 
Q). But if "Q" is in fact false, then (since (H & X) ~ P and P ~ Q) "X" 
also is false, and it will be true that -(-X -t Q). And if "Q" is false, it cannot 
be entailed by "H," so -(H ~ Q) will also be true. So if S by causing it to 
be the case that X would bring it about that P, and P ~ Q and -Q, then S by 
causing it to be the case that X would also bring it about that Q. 
Now suppose that S has the power to bring it about that P by causing it to 
be the case that X. It follows, trivially, that S does have the power to cause 
it to be the case that X. But it was shown above that S's causing it to be the 
case that X would bring it about that Q-always assuming, of course, that P ~ 
Q and -Q. SO if S has the power to bring it about that P by causing it to be 
the case that X, S also has the power to bring it about that Q.24 Which is to 
say: If it is in S's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and 
"Q" is false, then it is in S's power to bring it about that Q. Q.E.D.25 
It would seem, then, that, with Flint's help, we have succeeded in answering 
two of his major criticisms of PEP. We have a definition of "bringing about" 
which, while not perfectly precise, is articulate enough to put to rest charges 
of vagueness and ambiguity. And there can be no reasonable doubt that, 
given this definition, PEP is true. This, I think, represents real philosophical 
progress-and it narrows the options considerably for critics of PEP. So far 
as I can see, there are only two possibilities remaining: they can argue against 
the definition on the grounds that it fails to capture our intuitive notion of 
bringing about, or they can attack PEP directly by producing counterexam-
ples?6 It will be interesting to see what can be made of these two possibilities. 
Thomas Flint, however has suggested (in correspondence) yet another pos-
sible difficulty with (BA4 *). This definition, he claims, permits the Molinist 
to argue in a perfectly straightforward way that an agent does have the power 
to bring about the truth of her counterfactuals of freedom. But if this is so, 
then the success of the definition in other respects (as argued above) is by 
no means a triumph for the anti-Molinist. On the contrary, it undermines the 
very conclusion the anti-Molinist is determined to establish, namely that we 
do not have the power in question. 
Now, Flint is entirely correct in claiming that (BA4*), taken together with 
Molinist premises, implies that an agent can bring about the truth of her own 
counterfactuals?7 He is mistaken, however, in supposing that this fact con-
stitutes a difficulty for the anti-Molinist. To see why it does not, we have 
only to reflect on the formal structure of the refutation of middle knowledge. 
That argument, in all of its forms, is a reductio ad absurdum; it takes Molinist 
premises, together with other plausible principles, to establish an anti-Molin-
ist conclusion, namely that there are no true counterfactuals of freedom. If 
the argument is valid (and Flint has admitted that it is, at least in its original 
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form), then we know immediately that it contains inconsistent premises-and 
of course we also know that from inconsistent premises anything whatever 
can be deduced; in particular, it can be deduced that an agent has the power 
to bring about the truth of her own counterfactuals of freedom. 
The important question, then, is not whether this conclusion can be deduced 
from those premises, but rather which of the premises ought to be rejected. 
Since the Molinist will not give up any of the Molinist premises, it becomes 
incumbent on him to say which other premise(s) should be rejected, and why. 
With regard to the original form of the argument, premise (2) seems to be the 
target of choice for Flint and other Molinists. And while I think that premise 
can be defended, there doesn't at this point seem to be any way to resolve 
the disagreement concerning it. But this premise is not an assumption either 
of Adams' argument, or of my modification of that argument. So it would 
seem that Molinists need to gi ve convincing reasons for rejecting the premises 
of the revised argument, if they are to avoid the conclusion that it is Molinism 
itself that is to be rejected.28 
Huntington College 
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